In The Atlantic, military expert Phillips Payson O’Brien said Ukraine handled the war much better than many analysts expected, and that the Ukrainian way of waging the war could lead to what once seemed almost impossible: victory.
“The Ukrainian way of waging war is a coherent, intelligent and well-thought-out strategy to fight the Russians, calibrated to take advantage of specific Russian weaknesses.. It allowed the Ukrainians to remain mobile, by destroying logistics, helped force the Russians to remain stationary for a long time, exposed the Russians to heavy losses from exhaustion, and in the Battle of Kyiv led to a not quite final victory. A political game of Russian conquest,” wrote O’Brien. Professor of Strategic Studies at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland.
In his opinion, the Ukrainian war style contains many of the most important elements, among which it lists: Competing for air dominance on the battlefield, preventing the Russians from taking control of cities, complicating the communications and logistics of the Russian army.This allows the Russian forces to move in columns that are difficult to support and attack these columns from all sides.
According to O’Brien, competition for air supremacy is “the basis of Ukrainian success” because it “allows Ukrainian forces to maneuver while irritating Russian forces for fear of being attacked.”
“The Ukrainians have never gained air superiority because the Russian air force is too numerous and the Russian forces are well-equipped with anti-aircraft systems, but the Ukrainian plan made it difficult for the Russian air force to patrol combat zones” – emphasizes the author.
In addition, O’Brien notes that the Ukrainians “turned their cities into fortresses”, which greatly complicated Russian logistics and communications: “The Russians can still transport troops by road, but the need to avoid cities controlled by Ukrainian forces forces their forces to On it. Take longer and more difficult paths.”
Then according to an expert The Ukrainians allowed the Russian troops to “stretch along the roads”, which, given the muddy season, “limited (the possibilities) to narrow the paved roads. In addition to limiting their mobility.”
Subsequently, the Ukrainians launched attacks on long Russian columns, which were carried out by the “air forces (the most famous of which are Turkish Bayraktar drones), special forces, long-range artillery, and even large conventional formations”, and “the losses caused by the Ukrainian attacks hindered the Russian attempts to muster enough forces to attack Kyiv.”
Although the Russians attempted to move on from Sumy, Chernihiv and the northwest, “Ukrainian resistance meant that they never mustered enough forces to lay siege to Kyiv, let alone storm it,” the author explains.
He also argues that “instead of directly attacking Russian heavy artillery and tank formations, the Ukrainians used light and maneuverable forces to take advantage of Russia’s weaknesses and achieve victory.”
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