Three years before the Smolensk disaster, a very similar incident occurred in Russia. Fog and poor communication between the crew and the control tower.
In preparation for the flight, the crew studied numerous documents, including weather data at Samara Airport. Each airport has its own minimum horizontal visibility at which an aircraft can still land. The minimum horizontal visibility for landing at the destination airport is 550 meters and vertical visibility is 60 metres.
As the crew prepared to fly, horizontal visibility was only 200 metres. Naturally, landing in such weather was impossible. However, according to the forecast, weather conditions are expected to improve and horizontal visibility to increase to 3 kilometers by the time the aircraft arrives. The captain decided to take off, and 50 passengers boarded.
At four o’clock in the morning, the plane took off from Surgut and headed to Samarra. The flight is going normally. The crew contacts Earth several times and asks about the current weather in Samara. After the sender confirms this Weather conditions improved, and the crew began preparations for landing.
The pilots planned to land on runway 23 because the second runway was covered in fog. The meteorologist whose job was to monitor visibility was 3 kilometers from the end of runway 23f He did not notice that the wind suddenly changed direction and pushed the fog towards runway 23.
At 06:37, visibility dropped to 800 metres, and the weather station officer did not report this, despite his knowledge that visibility had dropped significantly. Shortly afterwards, visibility was recorded at 608 metres, below the minimum landing level at the airport.
At this point, the airport is completely covered in dense fog and visibility is reduced to a critical level. The dispatcher was able to give the pilots a value of 800 meters but in reality the horizontal visibility was 600 metresThe vertical visibility range was between 40 and 15. This arrangement did not meet the minimum values for a safe landing, so the approach had to be cancelled. But the pilots confidently steer the plane onto the runway because they believe visibility is 800 meters and they should see the ground soon. Less than a minute separates us from disaster.
As a result, neither the dispatcher nor the crew has actual sighting data· Pilots fly through fog and try to look at the ground, but there is only fog around them.
While on the glide path, the crew releases the flaps to the landing position, thus violating flight instructions. According to the instructions, the flaps must be extended by 2-3 kilometers before entering the zip line. Releasing the flaps caused the aircraft to quickly rise and leave the glide path. The co-pilot tilts the rudder away from himself and attempts to return the aircraft to the designated taxiway. The speed increases to 310 km/h, which is 50 km/h above the recommended speed. This approach is clearly unstable and another round is necessary.
At an altitude of 60 metres, the commander must make a decision: land or abort? He can’t see anything around him. The captain is silent. He does his best to search for land.
Only at an altitude of 25 metres, the captain gives the order to abort the landing, but it is too late. A Tu-134 aircraft lands on snow-covered ground 305 meters from the end of the runway. The left wing separated from the fuselage and the aircraft rolled onto its back.
Of the 57 people on board, 6 passengers died. All seven crew members and remaining passengers sustained injuries of varying severity.
Analysis of the flight data recorder showed that there was no technical malfunction in the plane before the accident. The Russian Interstate Aviation Committee MAK reported this Both engines ran until they hit the ground.
According to MAK, the blame for the disaster can be attributed to the services at the airport, which did not inform the crew in time about the limited visibility, and to the pilot who did not decide to abort the landing and go around.
At high resolution, in the absence of reliable visual contact with approach lights and airport surroundings, The flight crew failed to make a timely decision to conduct a missed approach.
As a result of the trial, the captain was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment, and the co-pilot to two years’ imprisonment.
Source: Wikipedia
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